



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

OPNAVINST 5210.16
Op-981N
21 SEP 1978

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5210.16

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Security of nuclear reactors and special nuclear material

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3120.32
(b) NAVSEAINST C9210.22
(c) OPNAVINST 3540.3B
(d) NAVSEAINST 5510.7

Encl: (1) DOD Directive 5210.63 of 24 April 1978

1. Purpose. This instruction implements enclosure (1) which establishes Department of Defense policy and guidance for the safeguarding of nuclear reactors and special nuclear material.

2. Discussion


a. In issuing enclosure (1), the Department of Defense recognizes the importance of nuclear reactors and special nuclear material to the national defense and the need to provide special protection for these components from sabotage, theft, loss or diversion. Enclosure (1) requires each military department to establish appropriate safeguards for nuclear reactors and special nuclear material under its cognizance.

b. Within the Department of the Navy there has been longstanding recognition of the importance of safeguarding nuclear reactors and special nuclear material. Specific standards and procedures for protecting such components have been issued and are currently set forth in references (a) through (d). Reference (a), in conjunction with reactor operating manuals and procedures, establishes requirements for safeguarding naval nuclear reactors aboard ship. Reference (b), in conjunction with security regulations in effect Navy-wide, establishes requirements for safeguarding Navy special nuclear material in storage. References (c) and (d) establish requirements for auditing the protection afforded naval nuclear reactors and special nuclear material.

OPNAVINST 5210.16
21 SEP 1978

c. A review of the policy and guidance set forth in enclosure (1) indicates that Navy implementation has been achieved through issuance of references (a) through (d).

3. Action. Navy compliance with enclosure (1) shall be assured through strict adherence by all commands to the requirements of references (a) through (d), as appropriate.



JAMES W. NANCE
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Director of Naval Administration

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ASD(C)

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials

- Refs.:
- (a) Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations - Energy, Part 73 (10 CFR 73)
 - (b) DoD Directive 5210.8, "Policy on Investigations and Clearance of DoD Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information," February 15, 1962
 - (c) DoD Directive 3224.3, "Physical Security Equipment: Assignment of Responsibility for Research, Engineering, Procurement, Installation, and Maintenance," December 1, 1976
 - (d) through (i), see enclosure 1

A. PURPOSE

This Directive provides the policy, criteria, and standards for the safeguarding of Department of Defense nuclear reactors and special nuclear material.

B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1. The provisions of this Directive apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the Unified and Specified Commands (hereafter referred to as "DoD Components").

2. Its provisions encompass all DoD reactor facilities and special nuclear material. This Directive does not apply to those nonactive or decommissioned reactor facilities when no fissile material is present.

3. This Directive does not abrogate or abridge the:

a. Authority or responsibility of a commander to apply more stringent security standards during emergencies or at any other time that the threat to these resources should indicate additional measures are necessary,

b. Responsibility of components possessing special nuclear material or operating nuclear reactors under Nuclear Regulatory Commission license, to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73 (reference (a)).

C. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.

D. POLICY

1. Nuclear reactors and special nuclear material require special protection because of their importance to the military testing program and the consequences of unauthorized use of nuclear materials. The conservation of special nuclear material; the safety of the public, operating personnel, and property; and protecting special nuclear material from sabotage, theft, loss, or diversion are of paramount importance during all phases of operations.

2. Each DoD Component shall develop procedures to comply with existing statutory accountability requirements for special nuclear material. In addition to any current requirements for inventory discrepancy reporting, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) shall be informed of such discrepancies.

3. Each DoD Component shall develop instructions in consonance with this policy which will establish standards and criteria applicable to their nuclear reactors and special nuclear material.

4. The protection afforded nuclear reactors and special nuclear materials must counterbalance the inherent risks and threats associated therewith. Physical security measures, such as barriers, locks, lighting, and intrusion detection systems, in conjunction with actual reactor plant design features, must constitute a balanced, in-depth system which, in conjunction with the protection and rapid reaction forces, will preclude sabotage of reactor complexes and/or theft of special nuclear material. In providing essential protection, accurate assessment must be made of all relevant factors, such as:

- a. The location of the reactor;
- b. The configuration in which the reactor or special nuclear material are maintained;
- c. The nature and capabilities of potential threats;
- d. The reliability and capabilities of personnel responsible for the protection of the reactor and special nuclear materials; and
- e. The degree of enrichment, quantity, and activity level of special nuclear material.

5. Other important considerations should include the nature, composition, and conditions of the nuclear material at the reactor site in order to arrive at a judgment of its value to potential adversaries, the difficulties associated with its removal from the site, and the consequences to the surrounding environs of possible hostile action causing violent dispersal of radioactive material.

6. Commanders shall review on an annual basis the protection afforded nuclear reactors and special nuclear material under their control in conjunction with current intelligence and all other relevant factors. Security programs shall be reviewed as necessary to assure adequate protection of these resources at all times.

7. Access to special nuclear material shall be restricted to authorized persons and the number of persons afforded such access shall be kept to a minimum.

8. Personnel associated with and directly involved in the operation or security of reactors and/or special nuclear materials must possess a security clearance granted in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.8 (reference (b)).

9. Physical security equipment programs are to be accomplished in accordance with the following guidelines:

a. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering shall coordinate the security equipment aspects of the Nuclear Reactor and Special Nuclear Material Program.

b. Components of the standardized DoD intrusion detection system are to be utilized to meet common physical security equipment needs.

c. The processing of requirements for security equipment unique to securing or monitoring reactors or special nuclear materials shall be governed by the provisions of DoD Directive 3224.3 (reference (c)).

10. Security plans shall be developed and maintained which will provide the capability to withstand or repel concentrated penetration and seizure efforts by terrorist or other criminal elements. Every means available, to include the use of deadly force, shall be used to preclude the unauthorized removal of special nuclear material from a reactor site or other storage location.

a. Restrictions on the use of force prescribed in DoD Directive 5210.56 (reference (d)) shall not be applicable to the security mission provided for by this Directive. Correct interpretation of the intent and temper of suspect elements is an essential element of an adequate security posture.

b. Supporting security forces shall be provided detailed

guidance and training in recognizing the difference between forceful and determined hostile penetration, and the assembly of demonstrators, inadvertent trespassing, or comparable encroachments.

11. Supervisory personnel shall be required to closely monitor the performance of duties of personnel working with nuclear reactors and/or special nuclear materials to ensure that these individuals are fully capable of performing their duties properly. Specifically, the supervisors should watch for any evidence of impaired capabilities due to extraneous factors.

E. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the senior DoD official having authority and responsibility for the establishment of uniform DoD security policy.

2. The DoD Physical Security Review Board, as established by DoD Directive 5100.76 (reference (e)), shall advise and assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) on matters involving the security of nuclear reactors and special nuclear materials.

3. Heads of DoD Components shall effect necessary programming, budgeting, and accounting actions to assure fulfillment of nuclear reactors and special nuclear materials security requirements.

F. INCIDENTS

All incidents and threats related to theft or sabotage, of a security significance, pertaining to reactor complexes or their special nuclear material shall be reported in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 7730.12 (reference (f)). A copy of such report shall be provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), or his designee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy).

G. INTELLIGENCE

The acquisition and exchange of intelligence concerning threats to nuclear reactors and special nuclear materials will be in accordance with DoD Directive 5200.27 and Executive Order 11905 (references (g) and (h)). Minimum requirements are detailed in enclosure 3.

H. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION


Public release of information regarding incidents and threats related to theft or sabotage at reactor complexes shall be governed by the provisions of DoD Directive 5230.16 (reference (i)).

I. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of the

Apr 24, 78
5210.63

implementing instructions of DoD Components supporting or having responsibility for nuclear reactors and special nuclear material for review to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) within 120 days.


Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 3

1. References, Continued
2. Definitions
3. Intelligence

Apr 24, 78
5210.63 (Encl 1)

REFERENCES, Continued

- (d) DoD Directive 5210.56, "Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties," May 10, 1969
- (e) DoD Directive 5100.76, "Physical Security Review Board," May 17, 1977
- (f) DoD Directive 7730.12, "Notification Procedures for Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Reactors and Radioactive Materials," (FOUO) August 1, 1976
- (g) DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense," December 8, 1975
- (h) Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," February 18, 1976
- (i) DoD Instruction 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance," August 8, 1967

INTELLIGENCE

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Military Departments, consistent with the policies of DoD Directive 5200.27 (reference (g)) as detailed below, and Executive Order 11905 (reference (h)), shall provide commanders or organizations responsible for the safety and security of these reactors and special nuclear materials with current intelligence concerning threats to these resources. As a minimum:

a. The DIA will establish collection requirements to obtain information concerning individuals or groups that have professed plans or intentions to conduct sabotage, theft, or terrorist activity involving special nuclear materials.

b. The Military Departments shall respond to the DIA originated collection requirements by directing their counterintelligence and/or criminal investigation agencies to actively seek information concerning threats to special nuclear materials. Threat information obtained will be promptly reported through intelligence channels and to appropriate commanders and to organizations responsible for the safety and security of special nuclear materials. Specifically:

(1) In the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U. S. territories and possessions, information concerning threats to these materials emanating from individuals or organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense shall be obtained by military counterintelligence and/or criminal investigative units through close and continuing contact with FBI and other Federal/State agency field offices and local law enforcement agencies.

(2) Outside the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U. S. territories and possessions, information from all sources, including host national intelligence and law enforcement agencies, concerning threats to the security of special nuclear materials, shall be collected, disseminated, and held, as appropriate.

c. DIA, the Military Departments, and the Unified and Specified Commands shall ensure that applicable information concerning threats and incidents related to security of special nuclear materials is exchanged among the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands and that this information is provided to commanders responsible for the safety and security of these materials.

2. Military Departments investigative organizations shall establish and maintain close and continuing liaison with their supported Military Department commanders who have special nuclear material responsibilities. Commanders responsible for the safety and security of special nuclear materials shall keep DIA and Military Departments counterintelligence organizations informed concerning (a) requirements for counterintelligence

evaluated information and support related to the security of special nuclear materials, and (b) local incidents posing a threat to the security of these materials.

3. Subject to annual validation, commanders responsible for the safety and security of special nuclear materials may retain threat information as long as it is current, valid, and relevant to the security of these materials under their responsibility.